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Abstract: The concept of ontological security has made increasing headway within 
International Relations, in particular through its ability to offer alternative 
explanations of the forces underpinning security dilemmas and conflict in world 
politics. While welcoming the insights already provided by its application, this article 
argues that the concept’s use to date has been too much geared to questions of 
identity-related stability, with change viewed as disturbing and anxiety-inducing. In 
contrast, the article calls for a more open understanding that: (i) links ontological 
security to reflexivity and avoids collapsing together the concepts of self, identity and 
ontological security; (ii) avoids privileging securitization over desecuritization as a 
means for generating ontological security; and (iii) opens out the concept beyond a 
narrow concern with questions of conflict and the conduct of violence more towards 
the theorization of positive change. 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
Recently, the concept of ontological security has made headway in theoretical debates 
about security in International Relations (IR). Understood broadly as a subject’s 
capacity to uphold a stable view of its environment and thereby ‘go on’ with everyday 
life, the concept has been utilized to provide alternative explanations of various 
phenomena, from the reproduction of security dilemmas (Mitzen 2006; Rumelili 
2015a) to the radicalization of individuals in an era of global terrorism (Croft 2012).  
 
The general presupposition of most of this literature is that actors (with the focus 
usually on states) prefer stability and certitude to change, which is seen as generating 
anxieties and therefore best avoided. Actors are therefore liable to reassert established 
patterns of behaviour, routines and identities, rather than embrace change precisely 
because of the perceived need and value of maintaining stable self-concepts.  
 
Such works, focusing on what has been called ‘security-in-being’, have provided 
important insights.1 However, the application of ontological security to IR arguably 
has been geared too much toward identity-related stability. With the emphasis on 
maintaining stable and safe identities, change has been perceived as something 
disturbing and potentially harmful. The application of the concept has thus been 
largely premised on a restrictive understanding of ontological security that narrows its 
focus in IR to questions of the preservation of extant identities and, more specifically, 
the perceived need to ensure the security of identity as a motivator of (state) action – 
in particular of conflictual practices. In this article we return to ontological security’s 
                                                        
1 For a broader collection of contributions employing ontological security as an inroad into 
studies on conflict resolution, see Rumelili (2015b). 
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philosophical underpinnings in order to provide it with a different interpretation, one 
emphasizing adaptability rather than stability, and in doing so seek to liberate it from 
the tendency to link ontological security closely to practices of securitization. We 
make three central points.  
 
First, by showing how, in their empirical analyses, established IR accounts of 
ontological security have tended to conflate the self with identity, we argue they have 
similarly reduced ontological security to a question of identity preservation. This 
collapsing together of the self, identity and ontological security is problematic 
because attempts to reinforce an established identity can actually at times undermine 
the actor’s sense of ontological security. Instead of identity being the essence of 
ontological security, we argue that identity(ies) are better viewed as crucial elements 
in the self’s attempts at achieving it. Instead of conflating self and identity, 
ontological security analysis would therefore benefit from analysing how subjects 
become connected to particular identities and why they articulate identity claims in 
the way they do.2 Overall, ontological security is not just a question of stability, but 
also adaptability, i.e. openness towards and the ability to cope with change.  
 
Second, we highlight how in existing analyses the reduction of ontological security to 
identity preservation typically is understood to result in securitization processes 
designed to solidify and close down an identity, with the stability brought about by 
securitization’s ‘freezing’ of identities seen as enhancing ontological security. In 
                                                        
2 Notably, the self-identity distinction is viewed in some quarters as inherently problematic 
because it is seen to presume the existence of a pre-social self, an essentialised ego, that 
instrumentally selects identities at will. Such a view fails to understand how individuals are 
embedded within social contexts from their very genesis, or ‘thrown into the world’ to use a 
Lacanian formulation. Following the Lacanian theme the self-identity distinction might be 
alternatively reformulated in terms of one between subjectivity and identity.  
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contrast, identity transformation and opening up identities for change through 
adaptation and engagement in reflexive processes is viewed as threatening ontological 
security by generating unwarranted stress, uncertainty and anxiety. This has resulted 
in a problematic association whereby securitization – the construction of identities on 
the basis of the negative difference provided by radical otherness and enmity – is seen 
to enhance identity-related stability and therefore also ontological security, whereas 
desecuritization processes promoting change are viewed as fundamentally 
destabilizing.  
 
This view is problematic on two levels. First, since identities are always in the 
making, never fully stable, settled and complete, the promise of stability in 
securitization practices is illusory. Alternative possibilities for self-articulation always 
exist and this plurality may even improve the chances of generating ontological 
security, rather than necessarily detracting from it. Therefore, instead of the emphasis 
on identity stability, more focus is needed on how reflexivity towards identity is also 
central to ontological security. Second, the association of securitization with stability 
and desecuritization with change and instability is also problematic because both 
entail the destabilization of a prevailing state of affairs. This also means, however, 
that desecuritization – and not just securitization – may be central to re-stabilization 
processes.  
 
Our third argument pertains to studies highlighting the relationship between identity-
stability and physical violence. These studies, premised on the view that on occasions 
ontological stability has been aspired for at the expense of physical security, have as 
such brought about important and innovative analysis with respect to various current-
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day forms of violence such as those related to migration (Croft, 2012; Huysmans, 
1998).  There is, however, the risk that these approaches provide, at least indirectly, a 
normative justification for the conduct of violence, and may also, in the field of IR-
theory, reinforce various traditional approaches, including even realist and Hobbesian 
views of international relations. Framed more broadly, the conflation of self with 
identity and the emphasis on securitization dynamics has resulted in ontological 
security being invoked too narrowly, with the tendency so far being to emphasise how 
debates about identity can easily spill over into violence and questions of physical 
security.   
 
The temptation to prove the concept’s value by focusing on the dynamics between 
identity-stability and the conduct of violence is, as such, quite understandable. 
However, in the contemporary world articulations of identity related to security are 
arguably as much the exception as the rule. Indeed, such articulations are today just as 
likely to be made by prioritizing economic contexts, especially insofar as states are 
transforming into ‘competition states’ (Cerny, 1990). In fact, the tendency to contrast 
ontological security to physical security, thereby perceiving other forms of difference-
construction as secondary and marginal, neglects the extent to which a profoundly 
different environment now exists, and one where traditional security concerns often 
no longer have primacy. This calls for a quite different thematization of ontological 
security and one more attuned to changing normative environments in which different 
sorts of identities are claimed. Established and changing norms of subjectivity are 
particularly important in this respect, with the desire to match up to and gain 
recognition as particular types of subject, central to many elements of ontological 
security seeking. 
 6 
  
Ontological Security beyond Identity 
 
To reiterate, our first argument is that by conflating self with identity the literature on 
ontological security in IR has also in turn tended to reduce ontological security down 
to concerns of identity preservation. The point can be demonstrated with reference to 
two specific works by Mitzen (2006) and Steele (2008), which we highlight because 
they have quickly gained the status of providing seminal statements on the relevance 
of ontological security to world politics. They are, as such, perhaps the two most 
widely referenced texts in the field.  
 
The conflation between self and identity and the subsequent reduction of ontological 
security down to questions of identity is evident in Mitzen’s initial outlining of 
ontological security. Drawing on Giddens and Laing, Mitzen (2006: 342) notes that 
‘Ontological security refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous 
person in time – as being rather than constantly changing – in order to realize a sense 
of agency’. She continues, however, by arguing that ‘Individuals need to feel secure 
in who they are, as identities or selves. Some, deep forms of uncertainty threaten this 
identity security’ (Mitzen 2006: 342 emphases added).  
 
The first point to note here is how identities and selves are presented as largely 
interchangeable terms. Insofar as a distinction is made, selves figure merely as a 
reflection of identities. This, we suggest, is problematic as it misunderstands the role 
of identity in processes constituting subjectivity. Seen from a Lacanian perspective, 
the idea of a unified self with a single coherent identity is problematic and is itself ‘an 
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imaginary construct that the individual needs to believe in to compensate for a 
constitutive lack that lies at the core of her (or his) identity’ (Epstein 2010: 334). 
Thus, while subjects lack singular identities they necessarily engage in practices of 
identification as part of ongoing attempts to capture a sense of being and to locate the 
self in the world. Such attempts, however, are never finalized as ‘dislocatory events’ 
will undermine established identifications and compel subjects ‘to identify with new 
objects and discourses to fill the lack made visible’  (original emphasis) (Glynos and 
Howarth 2008: 162-3; Edkins 2003: 366). 
 
Second, however, identities and their stability are then prioritized as the foundation of 
ontological security, a move that ultimately enables Mitzen to draw a distinction 
between physical security and ontological security, a distinction that has become 
somewhat defining of how many people have come to view and utilize the concept. 
This is not least because the conceptual distinction introduced by Mitzen provides the 
basis for her core claim, one that fundamentally challenges established assumptions in 
the discipline. This is that ontological security concerns – the need to preserve a stable 
sense of identity – frequently outweigh considerations of physical security in the 
motivations underlying actors’ behaviour. Since ‘individual identity is formed and 
sustained through relationships’, states, she argues, may thus prefer the continuation 
of a harmful or apparently self-defeating conflictual relationship precisely because the 
enduring conflict reaffirms a sense of certainty about the identity of both oneself and 
the other (Mitzen 2006: 342). 
 
Steele concurs, arguing that while material concerns of physical existence and social 
needs are important, the driving force of state behaviour is the need to secure and 
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maintain a particular and established self-identity through time. Like Mitzen, 
therefore, he argues states will ‘pursue social actions to serve self-identity needs, even 
when these actions compromise their physical existence’ (Steele 2008: 2). What states 
seek to avoid, from his perspective, are behaviours that might radically disrupt their 
sense of self-identity and become a source of shame and anxiety as a result of the 
moral implications of failing to live up to who one claims to be (also Steele 2005).  
 
Importantly, Steele’s analysis differs from Mitzen’s on various points. For example, 
while Mitzen adopts a relational approach to identity/ontological security, Steele 
(2008: 2-3) posits selves that generate a self-biography, an identity narrative of who 
they are that assists them in maintaining ‘consistent self-concepts’, and which 
provides the bases and established form of articulation upon which they then interact 
with the world. However, insofar as articulations deviating from established 
biographical identity narratives are viewed as creating dissonance and therefore 
potentially harmful, his analysis, like Mitzen’s, also ultimately becomes one about 
protecting and living up to the particular claims to identity an actor might make. As 
such, it too in effect shifts the concern of ontological security from the self to 
questions of identity-related stability. 
 
Importantly, this reduction of ontological security down to the perceived need to 
uphold particular understandings of identity, a move that results in identity being 
prioritized over Self, is actually somewhat retroactive in these two core texts. This is 
to say that in outlining the concept’s contours, the subsumption of ontological security 
to identity is not immediately apparent. Indeed, at the conceptual level analysts have 
remained relatively faithful to the development of the concept by the sociologist 
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Anthony Giddens. Thus, following Giddens both Mitzen and Steele emphasise the 
importance of ‘basic trust’ and ‘reflexivity’ to an actor’s search for ontological 
security. 
 
For Giddens (1991: 38-39) ‘basic trust’ is fundamental to ontological security and 
refers to a sense of confidence and trust in the nature of the world – the ‘existential 
anchorings of reality’ in his terms – and optimism that things generally work out in 
the end. For individuals basic trust is a product of positive early childhood relations 
with key caregivers, with this developing a sense of reliability in persons and one’s 
environment. Basic trust, he argues, is fostered through the emergence of habit and 
routines in the relationships between the infant and its caregivers, with such routines 
becoming ‘a crucial bulwark against threatening anxieties’. 
 
While routines are understood as central in helping create a sense of stability about 
the nature of the world, Giddens is also clear that routinization and the subsequent 
aspiration to achieve identity-related stability can go too far. What is needed on 
occasion is not an ability to uphold stability and defend the prevailing state of affairs, 
but the ability to cope with change.  As he puts it, ‘a blind commitment to established 
routines, come what may, is a sign of neurotic compulsion’, and generally results 
from an infant’s failure to develop a healthy sense of basic trust (Giddens 1991: 40). 
Characteristic of basic trust, therefore, is a capacity for reflexivity enabling the 
individual to move forward, confronting life’s various ups and downs creatively and 
innovatively. From this perspective, therefore, for an individual with a well-developed 
sense of basic trust, anxiety is not necessarily something to be feared. It may, instead, 
even be welcomed in calling for change, dynamism and renewal – a point noted by 
 10 
both Mitzen (2006: 350) and Steele (2008: 61). Likewise, as stated by Rumelili (2015: 
13), anxiety is not merely restraining but also contains positive potential in providing 
‘the actor with that critical, yet fleeting, moment of freedom and choice’. 
 
Understood this way ontological security is not a question of identity per se, but rather 
of an actor’s capacity to cope with uncertainty and change – something which might 
actually entail developing and altering the identity narrative, emphasising one identity 
over another or shifting to a new identity entirely. Indeed, understood as such claims 
to specific identities are simply one mechanism by which actors may seek to locate 
themselves and routinize their relationships with the world – whether that world is 
comprehended as stable or changing. 
 
However, when applied to specific cases ontological security analysis in IR has a 
tendency to focus precisely on instances where healthy basic trust, reflexivity and 
flexibility are absent. Thus, Mitzen’s analysis of the perpetuation of security 
dilemmas is ultimately one that deals with actors which have ‘rigid or maladaptive 
basic trust’ and which therefore are unable to maintain distance from their routines. 
Such an actor, she notes, ‘treats routines as ends in themselves rather than as a means 
toward realizing her goals’ (Mitzen 2006: 350). In such situations actors are likely to 
cling to their routines more tightly, irrespective of the fact that this might reproduce 
dysfunctional relationships, physical threats to the self, as well as an inability to 
articulate the self in ways more attuned to external conditions. Indeed, for Steele 
(2008: 61) rigid routines ‘not only prevent us from reforming our actions, they inhibit 
our humanity’.  
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To be clear, we are not suggesting that Mitzen is in any sense wrong, rather that in 
focusing her empirical analysis on cases where actors lack a healthy sense of basic 
trust, she is ultimately focusing on cases in which the actors’ sense of self has been 
collapsed into specific accounts or routinizations of their respective identities. Her 
analysis is therefore fundamentally one of ontological insecurities, not ontological 
security. What we get is therefore only one part of the picture of ontological security’s 
analytical insight for international relations. 
 
Mitzen is not alone in this. In focusing on the difficulties present in conflict resolution 
in long-standing conflicts as well as potential solutions, Rumelili (2015a) likewise 
emphasizes cases where claims to identity premised on the generation of enemy 
images have ultimately collapsed the self/identity distinction, privileging the 
protection of specific claims to identity as the essence of ontological security and 
selfhood rather than seeing this as an instance of its inversion. Similarly, Zarakol’s 
(2011) study of how Russia, Turkey and Japan have remained trapped in stigmatized 
relations with the West, forever seeking recognition that is forever withheld, while 
apparently lacking the reflexive capacity to reposition themselves through alternative 
routines and identity narratives, is also one where ontological security becomes 
understood in terms of the recognition of specific claims to a stable and given 
identity. 
 
Ultimately, what arguably unites these different analyses is a primary focus on how 
identity constructions motivate state action in different ways, with this largely 
limiting ontological security analysis to instances when singular identities have 
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become manifest, largely hegemonic and therefore also rigid and constraining in 
nature. 
 
The critique is important because if ontological security analysis becomes understood 
as primarily concerned with questions of the motivational force of identity, then it is 
reasonable for critics to question what the concept adds beyond the already rather well 
established concern with identity in IR. For instance, it might be argued that Mitzen’s 
emphasis on the comforting force of the reproduction of enmity that underlies security 
dilemmas bears some resemblance to the poststructuralist emphasis on the 
identification of radicalized others as fundamental to constructing state identity – and 
which in Campbell’s (1998) account is one of the central functions of foreign policy. 
Likewise, Steele’s emphasis on the desire of states to live up to their self-
proclamations shares much with constructivist (Katzenstein 1996) and critical 
constructivist (Ringmar 1996) analyses emphasizing how interests are a product of 
identity constructions. Meanwhile, Zarakol’s emphasis on states’ apparently doomed 
attempts to overcome stigmatizations of inferiority resonates closely with the 
emphasis on processes of ‘auto-orientalism’ evident in some orientalist and post-
colonial literatures on identity (e.g. Thiong’o 1998). 
 
To the extent to which it can be construed as simply synonymous with identity, the 
danger, therefore, is that ontological security will soon become redundant. We 
therefore need a clearer sense of its added value. Arguably this might be found, not so 
much through analyzing the motivational force of particular identity constructions 
(important as that is), as in interrogating more closely the contextual nature of 
selfhood and the self’s reflexive ability and ways of articulation that might enable it to 
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shift between identities and routines in moving forward. In the final section we begin 
to open up some questions and lines of analysis in this regard, beforehand we turn to 
the question of securitization. 
 
Beyond Securitization, towards Reflexivity 
 
As indicated above, a clear sense of identity is often viewed as the central means 
through which actors are able to generate a sense of certainty about the world and 
their position within it. Maintaining clear and consistently regulated distinctions 
between the identity of the self and that of others, it is argued, can help establish an 
order and expectations of reciprocal behaviour in relationships.  
 
Focusing on this dynamic several scholars have analyzed potential links between the 
role of identity as a basis for grounding ontological security and its connection to the 
Copenhagen School’s emphasis on securitization processes and societal security. 
Croft (2012), for example, has explicitly sought to integrate a concern with 
ontological security into a re-framing of securitization theory. Focusing on Britain, he 
demonstrates how British identity has been reframed, and ontological security sought, 
through the securitization of a new Radical Other in the form of ‘the “jihadi” British 
Muslim’ (Croft 2012: 6). For Croft the ‘securitization of identity leads to the 
securitization of subjectivity – the intensified search for and/or attribution of a single, 
stable identity “regardless of its actual existence”’ (Croft quoting Kinnvall 2012: 73). 
In other words, what Croft is actually demonstrating is another instance of how 
selfhood and subjectivity have been collapsed into the prioritization of a particular 
identity – with the creation and maintenance of securitized identities (as in Mitzen’s 
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case) seen as providing the necessary certainties seen as central to ontological 
security. 
 
Rumelili’s (2015a) work on conflict resolution provides another interesting analysis. 
As highlighted by Wæver (2008) in respect of long running conflicts, conflict 
resolution processes are often difficult because they are no longer amenable to 
standard resolution strategies of working out compromises and agreements on the 
outstanding issues. The problem is that such approaches assume the possibility of a 
rationalistic, interest-based and utility-driven process of give and take by all parties; 
i.e. that the issues can actually be resolved through technical solutions. However, in 
long running conflicts the underlying causes are often contested (perhaps even 
forgotten), while more importantly, the conflicts have often come to frame the 
identities of the parties. Resolution would therefore require identity transformation. 
For Rumelili (2015a) this makes conflict resolution particularly difficult. Following 
Mitzen, she argues that conflicts can help foster a sense of ontological security by 
providing stable and clear-cut definitions of the identities held by self and other. Since 
conflict resolution requires flexibility, a willingness to rethink both the identity of the 
self and the other, it can therefore be felt as anxiety-inducing. In short, conflict 
resolution raises uncertainties about whether identities can remain stable, and 
therefore about what the future world will look like, what our identity will be in the 
absence of the enemy, what will we do, will we any longer be who we think we are. 
Faced with such anxieties actors may actually find solace in perpetuating the conflict 
and the securitized identities on which it rests – provided that identity-stability is seen 
as catering for ontological security. 
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Rumelili’s distinctive move, here, is to draw on Giddens’ distinction between anxiety 
and fear. As Giddens (1991: 43) notes, while ‘Fear is a response to a specific threat 
and therefore has a definite object’, anxiety lacks an object and ‘is a generalised state 
of the emotions of the individual’. Anxiety, in other words, concerns ‘perceived 
threats to the integrity of the security system of the individual’ (Giddens 1991: 44-5). 
Anxiety therefore raises the spectre that one’s established systems of meaning might 
be destabilized, potentially resulting in considerable feelings of disorientation, which 
might potentially undermine the self’s ability to provide a sufficient self-articulation.  
 
Building on this Rumelili reframes the distinction between ontological and physical 
security drawn in some of the literature. Whereas for Mitzen and Steele the distinction 
is primarily one of different referents (the self/identity in the case of ontological 
security, the body in the case of physical security), for Rumelili the distinction is 
rather one of the different sorts of emotions and practices they generate. Put 
succinctly, Rumelili suggests that the Copenhagen School’s concept of societal 
security retains the survivalist fears central to concerns about physical security. Thus, 
societal security focuses on identifiable objects of fear (e.g. immigrants) that are seen 
to threaten the continued viability of a pre-constituted identity. In contrast, 
‘Ontological security does not presuppose a threat to identity but underlines an 
ongoing concern with its stability’ (Rumelili 2015a). What she suggests, however, is 
that actors suffering ontological anxieties about the stability of their identities and 
systems of meaning are prone to deflect them through securitization processes that 
constitute objects of fear to physical security and thereby re-establish systems of 
meaning and certitude about the nature of the world and identity (Tillich 2014: 37). In 
other words, one way of dealing with anxieties about the unknown is to turn them into 
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the manageable certainties of objects of fear to physical security through 
securitization (also Steele 2008: 64). Securitization thereby becomes identified as the 
form of articulation most likely to generate ontological security.   
 
Understood as such, securitized identities therefore become viewed as sources of 
ontological security. However, this illuminates only part of the picture and in some 
respects overly simplifies (and potentially distorts) our understanding of ontological 
security.  
 
First, as Mälksoo (2015) has suggested, understood as such ontological security 
studies actually have the potential to end up providing a normative justification for the 
securitization of identity. In fact, to the extent to which analysts suggest that 
possessing stable biographies of the state’s identity enhances ontological security 
(instead of emphasizing the importance of reflexivity) this can come to 
naturalise/legitimize identity securitizing practices. In Mälksoo’s (2015: 223) terms, 
the problem is that such accounts of ontological security may actually end up 
‘ontologising’ – that is, normalizing and making inevitable – ‘a state’s need to seek 
and sustain the intactness and consistency of its identity [which] could dangerously 
depoliticize the act of protecting a biographical narrative of the state’ – i.e. the act of 
ontological security seeking by obscuring from view the fact that there are always 
other articulatory options available beyond that of securitization. This is why it is 
important to dissociate ontological security from identity per se and to retain an 
emphasis on the reflexive self. Indeed, without doing so ontological security studies 
may even threaten to curb ‘the self-reflexivity of the political subject’ (Mälksoo 2015: 
225). 
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Second, Rumelili’s (2015a) argument presupposes that while securitization might 
produce ontological security, desecuritization processes are liable to undermine it. 
This is why, she argues, conflict resolution processes can be so difficult, since while 
desecuritization may render safe previous objects of fear, it is also a process which in 
doing so destablises established modes of being and understandings (systems of 
meaning) of the nature of the world that are inevitably liable to generate anxieties.  
 
Arguably, though, the presumed differential impacts of securitizing and desecuritizing 
practices are too clearly drawn because securitizing practices have just as much 
potential to generate ontological anxieties as desecuritizing practices. This is because 
the securitization of an identity itself entails a transformation in conceptions of 
identity and systems of meaning, as it entails a movement of rigidifying, closing down 
and bordering, a transformation from a former situation when identity was not 
securitized and was more open. There is, hence, no a priori reason for assuming that 
processes of opening up are any more destabilizing than processes of closing down – 
as evidenced by concerns at the rise of the Right amongst cosmopolitan society within 
Europe. In the established literature, however, the move from non-securitized to 
securitized identities is largely obscured as a source of ontological insecurity, whereas 
change away from a securitized situation is viewed as inherently anxiety-inducing. 
 
Moreover, and as Croft (2012) indicates, while securitizations can end up generating 
ontological insecurities in others (British Muslims in his case), they can also have the 
same effect on the subject community itself. As he notes, the proliferation of 
insecuritization practices – not least in the form of anti-terrorist hotlines and 
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advertising campaigns emphasizing the everyday nature of the threat and the attendant 
proliferation of surveillance systems and responsibilities throughout society – have 
undermined societal trust and enhanced more general anxieties throughout the 
population. The emphasis, he notes, is increasingly on amorphous risks as much as on 
specifically identifiable threats (Croft 2012: 7-8). Thus, while British identity has 
become more rigid, the sense of general anxiety has actually, in this case, been 
heightened by the introduction of epistemological concerns about the need for 
vigilance in the face of myriad unspecified threats. In contrast, far from being 
inherently destabilizing to ontological security, desecuritizations may actually suggest 
the existence of a self possessing the reflexive ability to step back, employ alternative 
channels of articulation and opt for some other identity – abilities it has been 
suggested that are actually precisely at the heart of ontological security, but a point 
which only becomes evident if we resist conflating ontological security with the 
identity narratives that are invoked in its cause. 
 
This also leads to a third point, which is that the privileging of identity as that which 
needs to be secured in many analyses of ontological security in IR actually entails a 
privileging of security mindsets more generally. Expressed slightly differently, 
instead of focusing on ‘successful’ cases, where security does not seem to have been 
raised as an issue, the tendency has been to focus precisely on cases where a closing 
down of identity and sense of rigidity becomes evident – and hence where logics of 
security and the articulation of identities through discourses on existential danger 
enter the picture. This is limiting because – as already noted – focusing on cases of 
identity securitization, typified as they are by a lack of reflexivity on the part of the 
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self, is therefore to limit analyses to very particular examples of ontological 
insecurity.  
 
The danger, therefore, is that ontological security is only seen to matter in those 
instances when it is perceived as lacking. This is problematic because ontological 
security is never actually ‘secure’ as such (Croft 2012: 202). In a changing world the 
positioning of the self is always potentially fragile and something that has to be 
continually worked at as part of what Giddens (1991: 5) terms the ongoing ‘reflexive 
project of the self’. However, in setting this point aside there is the danger that 
ontological security becomes a perspective in which identity is always perceived as a 
question of security. The irony of this may therefore be that, despite its critical 
overtones, the application of ontological security to international relations may 
actually end up reconstituting an emphasis on survivalist logics that keeps security 
studies firmly focused on the familiar territory of war and political violence. While 
such a concern is more than understandable for security scholars, in the following 
section we begin to suggest broader avenues for the concept’s application within IR. 
 
Ontological Security, the Self and Subjectivity 
 
The central claim, so far, is that applications of ontological security in IR have tended 
to inadvertently conflate identity with selfhood. The assumption is that the self 
already has an identity, with ontological security primarily understood in terms of the 
preservation and management of identity claims. Most analyses therefore jump over 
the crucial question of how selves become connected to particular identities or 
articulate claims to identities in the way they do. In the following we raise a number 
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of tentative thoughts of what might be entailed in our insistence that self and identity 
need to be kept analytically apart. 
 
First, concerning understandings of the self’s nature and its relationship to identity 
and narrative, it is important to note that Giddens – the primary source for IR scholars 
working on the topic – himself invokes the couplet ‘self-identity’. It is also the case, 
however, that his elaboration of exactly what it comprises is ambiguous and open to 
different interpretations. For example, Giddens (1991: 52) emphasizes that self-
identity ‘presumes reflexive awareness’. He posits that identity is not just given but 
instead something ‘to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of 
the individual’. 
 
From this standpoint, it might appear that self and identity are two sides of the same 
coin, that lacking a sense of identity the self will suffer extreme anxiety, and indeed 
even in some sense cease to exist. As indicated earlier, our interpretation is different 
and rather assumes that the self is not given but ‘thrown into the world’, i.e. has to 
orientate itself in a world that is not of its own making. As stated by Glynos and 
Howarth (2008: 164), ‘Social agents always find themselves immersed in or ‘thrown 
into’ a system of meaningful practices… which both shapes their identity and 
structures their practices’. This also implies that articulations through identity 
narratives are always bound to remain somewhat open containing positive as well as 
negative options. While most analyses tend to shift the locus of ontological security to 
the actual content of the identity articulated in specific identity narratives, thereby 
shifting the emphasis from the self as the referent of ontological security to particular 
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identity claims attached to or articulated by it, in our view the crucial thing Giddens is 
pointing to is the existence of the self as a reflexive subject.3  
 
Put differently, it is not the content of the biography that counts (which might change 
dramatically over time), but the identification of the self as a biographically endowed 
person that aspires for articulation that ultimately matters. Thus, and with identity 
understood as socially constructed, Giddens’ point is arguably that 
personhood/subjectivity as being is not given as such but requires articulation. ‘To be 
a “person” is not just to be a reflexive actor, but to have a concept of a person (as 
applied both to the self and others)’ (Giddens 1991: 53). 
 
Giddens (1991: 53) argues, however, that the socially constituted requirements of 
subjectivity – and therefore ‘[w]hat a person is understood to be’ – are not fixed but 
may transform across time and space. Indeed, understanding the implications of such 
a transformation is the essence of his overall concern with how Late Modernity has 
impacted on self-identity. His book therefore seeks to chart the axiological change 
from traditional to post-traditional societies and the impacts this is having by breaking 
down established ways of being that deprive selves of established forms of 
articulation. However, while this is generating new anxieties for how actors generate 
a sense of meaning and position themselves in the world (not least through processes 
of identification), it is also providing new opportunities for becoming and new 
grounds for articulation.  
 
                                                        
3 Or in Lacanian terms, a split ‘subject of desire’/’discursive subject’ on a perpetual (but 
inevitably doomed) quest to capture and express its authentic fullness through processes of 
identification (Epstein 2011: 335-7). Or to invoke Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, a reflexive 
subject with ‘the capacity to choose among several possible ways of being’ (Inwood 2000: 24). 
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Thus, while the Enlightenment promise was that science and reason would bring 
certitude to the big existential questions, Giddens argues the opposite happened. First, 
science and reason undermined the previous systems of meaning of religion and 
traditional society by relativizing them. Second, the scientific claims that replaced 
them were, ultimately, themselves shown to be contingent because the scientific 
method is itself one premised on continual radical doubt and questioning (Giddens 
1991: 2-3; 21). Claims to truth in modernity are therefore inherently unstable. 
Combined with globalization, he argues, this creates a very new and challenging 
environment within which the reflexive project of the self needs to be undertaken.  
 
Indeed, the broader point here is that such transformations can fundamentally impact 
on the forms of personhood/subjectivity that become viewed as appropriate for the 
new situation and the sorts of identification processes that is likely to stimulate. Thus, 
Giddens argues that while in traditional societies the answer to the question of ‘How 
shall I live?’ was largely pre-given and ordained for the individual by tradition, in the 
post-traditional world of modernity the question becomes increasingly individualized 
(Giddens 1991: 14). What marks out the reflexivity of personhood in late modernity, 
therefore, is the need to cope with the contingencies of radical doubt (Giddens 1991: 
20). 
 
The emphasis on the constitutive importance of such transformations can be 
extrapolated out to IR insofar as the bases upon which claims to subjectivity have 
been made in international relations has changed over time. For example, while in the 
early nineteenth century the requirements of nationhood were (largely under 
Herderian influence) understood in terms of the requirement to be able to identify a 
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distinct culture, language and organic environment, by the end of the century (and 
now under Hegelian influence) those requirements had increasingly come to assume 
the additional criteria of territorial sovereignty (i.e. statehood), without which a nation 
would never be understood as fully complete or an equal member of the society of 
nations (see Browning and Joenniemi 2013; 2015a).  
 
In contrast, since the end of the Cold War a case could be made for suggesting that 
requirements of statehood have also begun to change in international relations, from a 
preoccupation with territorial sovereignty in a threatening environment of Hobbesian 
anarchy, to an enhanced emphasis on the market and the demands of the competition 
state (Browning 2015; Moisio 2008; Cerny 1990). Arguably, therefore, the socially 
mandated norms of subjectivity are themselves likely to, in some degree, impact on 
the sorts of identities a self (be it a state, nation, individual etc) might view as 
appropriate at any given time. Thus, as the normative environment changes and new 
norms of subjectivity emerge social agents ‘thrown into the world’ are liable to feel 
compelled to try out new articulations of self-identity more in tune with the changing 
normative environment.  
 
Another point stemming from this emphasis on the socially constructed nature of 
norms of subjectivity (selfhood) is that ontological security is intimately connected to 
inter-subjectivity and recognition dynamics. The point is that selves are not simply 
ascribed with subjectivity, it rather needs to be continually claimed, fought for, 
performed and articulated. As indicated above, the basic trust that lies at the heart of 
ontological security is itself fatefully linked to ‘the appraisals of others’ (Giddens 
1991: 38). In early childhood anxiety is fundamentally connected to the infant’s 
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sensing of disapproval from the caregiver, the result being that in later life the 
reactions of significant others also become central to one’s sense of self-esteem, 
confidence and ontological security (Giddens 1991: 45). This makes claiming 
subjectivity/selfhood an inherently social enterprise connected to meeting the 
contextually relevant criteria – of what it is to be a human, a nation, a state – and 
securing recognition for this from significant others. Actors failing to meet (or to 
secure recognition for having met) such criteria are liable to feel angered, shamed, 
and inadequate, with this undermining their sense of ontological security (Giddens 
1991: 65, 68).  
 
Zarakol’s analysis of stigmatization is highly relevant here, as one example of how 
this can play out in international relations. Her analysis highlights how the desire for 
‘international status, respect, and acceptance are primary motivators of decision-
making’ (Zarakol 2011:12). Applied to the cases of Russia, Turkey and Japan, she 
shows how each country historically has sought to meet the perceived criteria that 
would result in their acceptance into Western civilization and their recognition as full 
and equal members of international society. Stigmatised for their lack of civilization 
these countries set about emulating Western norms to thereby achieve an acceptable 
and broadly recognized form of identity, i.e. security-of-articulation. However, 
acceptance of the hierarchical Western worldview, she argues, also entailed accepting 
its judgments of their own inferiority, thereby generating significant levels of shame 
and ontological insecurity (Zarakol 2011: 39, 95-6).  
 
Arguably, therefore, some forms of recognition might be more conducive to 
ontological security than others. For example, invoking Hegel’s discussion of the 
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master-slave relationship, Zarakol (2011: 67-9, 83) suggests that while the master’s 
recognition by the slave is guaranteed, the slave’s lack of equal status arguably makes 
this ultimately unsatisfying. This is why, she suggests, ‘it is sometimes argued that 
only relationships of equal recognition can be stable in the long run’ (Zarakol 2011: 
83). 
 
Extrapolating from this we would agree with Berenskoetter (2007; 2010) that IR 
should take friendship relations within international politics more seriously. While in 
established approaches friendship is often viewed in instrumental cost-benefit utility-
maximizing terms this is not how people generally relate to friendship at an individual 
level, where it instead holds deep emotional significance. Indeed, as Cicero put it: ‘if 
the mutual love of friends were to be removed from the world, there is no single 
house, no single state that would go on existing’ (quoted in Smith 2011: 13). 
Explicitly linking friendship to ontological security Berenskoetter (2010) therefore 
views: 
 
friendship as a particular and morally significant relationship… [that]… 
strengthens moral certainty and the sense of what is “the right thing to do”… 
friendship matters because it moulds and reinforces “identity”, or the sense of 
Self.  
 
Friendship, however, also opens up space for rethinking the nature of self-other 
relations in IR and their importance for ontological security. Friendship entails 
equality, respect and solidarity. It is premised on far-reaching similitude, but also 
entails an acceptance of difference. Key, therefore, is that the difference required to 
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articulate safe identities can also comprise positive forms of difference, such as that 
present in friendship relations. It does not necessarily require articulations premised 
on fear-related negativities, i.e. those of radical otherness and enmity and a move 
from the normal to the existential spheres of politics. In fact, given that the presence 
of difference – positive or negative – is mandatory for achieving security-of-
articulation and the formation of identities, and that positive forms of difference are as 
equally important as negative forms in avoiding anxiety, then this undermines the 
distinction often invoked in IR between normal and existential politics. Rather, both 
appear as equally existential in providing the difference – if in different forms – that is 
mandatory for the articulation of identities to come about. As argued by Berenskoetter 
(2014: 59), actors may actually prefer friendship to enmity – and the employment of 
negative forms of otherness more generally – in the construction of their selves 
because friendship ‘does what enmity cannot, namely compel the actors to creatively 
support each other in formulating and sustaining their respective narratives through a 
shared idea of international order’.  
 
Finally, the emphasis on friendship and authentic social relations above also suggests 
another point that ultimately draws inspiration from Heidegger. It is easy to get the 
impression from reading Giddens and his interlocutors in IR that ontological security 
is primarily about the ability of the self to ‘go on’ (Giddens 1991: 35) – to manage 
everyday life without slipping into existential anxiety. The image conveyed often 
appears to be that of people struggling to psychologically hold it together. In Giddens’ 
terms, central to the individual’s ability to cope – to go on – is what he terms 
‘practical consciousness’, defined as a form of ‘non-consciousness’ rather than 
‘unconsciousness’. In non-conscious activity, it is not that people do not know what 
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they are doing, but that they have come to take such activities and understandings for 
granted. ‘Practical consciousness is the cognitive and emotive anchor’ of ontological 
security that brackets out existential ‘questions about ourselves, others and the object-
world which have to be taken for granted in order to keep on with everyday activity’. 
It is the ‘natural attitude’ on the other side of which ‘chaos lurks’ (Giddens 1991: 36-
7). What Giddens outlines here is what Heidegger refers to as everyday being and is 
something we are all necessarily engaged in, at least some of the time (Inwood 2000: 
27). 
 
However, for Heidegger everyday being – merely going on – is not enough. In 
general humans do not just want to go on (to survive), they want their going on to be 
meaningful and fulfilling. Heidegger therefore draws a distinction between an 
authentic and resolute being and the inauthentic and irresolute nature of everyday 
being/practical consciousness/natural attitude. Inauthentic everyday being entails 
plodding along with our routines. Authentic resolute being, however, is reflexive – 
though not simply in Giddens’ sense of reflecting on whether one’s routines and 
biographies any longer fit the current situation or need adapting. For Heidegger 
authentic resolute being entails reflecting on one’s situation and asking who do I want 
to be? How do I make my life meaningful? What is a virtuous life? Far from 
bracketing out anxiety, resolute authentic being actively invites anxiety in, since 
asking such questions is to accept a nagging sense of doubt as to whether what one is 
doing is actually right. The authentic person does this precisely because it is willing to 
confront its mortality and the inevitability of its death – an inevitability that adds 
urgency and resolve to make the most of one’s life (Inwood 2000: 69-79; Giddens 
1991: 50). The authentic resolute person therefore seizes on the possibilities of being 
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rather than simply drifting ‘with the tide of everydayness’ (Inwood 2000:84). In other 
words, from this perspective ontological security not only requires a reflexive 
capacity to adapt routines and identities to new situations, but also requires purposive 
meaningful engagement with who one wants to be. Thus, while Heidegger’s 
inauthentic being – Giddens’ practical consciousness/natural attitude – no doubt 
provides a sense of ontological security for everyday existence, the authentic self, 
reflexively aware of the limits of their life, seeks something more. In doing so, 
anxiety becomes a potentially generative and creative force. 
 
This perspective has relevance to IR in several respects. As Giddens (1991: 132) 
himself is aware, actors can become bored by routine and often engage in ‘cultivated 
risk-taking’ that deliberately exposes them to uncertainty. Moreover, his broader 
analysis of Late Modernity is also important here. The radical doubt and reflexivity 
central to modernity, he notes, can result in ‘the looming threat of personal 
meaninglessness’ (Giddens 1991: 201, original emphasis) that has ironically resulted 
in a resurgence in the appeal of religion and tradition – those systems of meaning 
precisely challenged by modernity – as a means of reclaiming a sense of purpose 
(Giddens 1991: 201-8). Arguably the globalization of liberal capitalism has also 
played into this, at least insofar as liberal capitalist commodification is experienced as 
fundamentally uninspiring. An emphasis on ontological security, therefore, should 
lead us to question these developments and what they might mean for international 
relations.  
 
 
Conclusions 
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In this contribution we have sought to challenge some of the assumptions evident in 
some of the earlier and best-known applications of ontological security within 
International Relations. While welcoming the insights of these analyses we have 
provided a re-reading of some of the concept’s philosophical underpinnings as a 
means of recovering a wider conception of ontological security that may serve as an 
encouragement for its broader application. In doing this three core and inter-related 
arguments have been developed. 
 
First, we have argued that there has been a tendency in analyses to reduce ontological 
security down to a question of identity preservation and stability, particularly when 
moving from theoretical development to empirical application. This tendency, we 
argued, stems from the propensity to conflate self with identity, seeing them as two 
sides of the same coin and largely interchangeable. In contrast, we argued the self 
should be viewed as analytically distinct from the identities it reaches for in order to 
secure a sense of being in the world. ‘Thrown into the world’ subjects necessarily 
engage in processes of identification, but since the world constantly evolves, 
dislocatory events will challenge existing identifications, potentially generating 
anxiety. In such situations subjects may well try and cling onto existing articulations 
of selfhood. However, while stability is an important element of ontological security, 
upholding a distinction between self and identity (identification) enables us to 
highlight that at its core ontological security also requires flexibility and adaptability 
– capacities closely related to a self’s more general sense of confidence, self-esteem 
and basic trust. Indeed, invoking Heidegger, we argued at the end of the article that in 
turn this enables us to understand that anxiety need not necessarily be something to be 
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assiduously avoided, but may actually be welcomed as offering chances for renewal 
and the pursuit of a more authentic and (potentially ethically) fulfilling life. 
 
Second, we argued that, in turn, the conflation of self and identity and the consequent 
reduction of ontological security down to questions of identity preservation has 
resulted in a focus on the securitization of identity as a means of achieving 
ontological security. This is problematic because: (i) it has the potential to encourage 
a normative endorsement of the securitization of identity; and (ii), because it assumes 
that while securitization enhances ontological security, desecuritization undermines it. 
In contrast, we have argued that since both securitization and desecuritization entail 
moving away from an established sense of selfhood/subjectivity to something either 
more closed/exclusive or open/inclusive, both potentially can be a source of 
ontological security or ontological insecurity. There is no a priori analytical reason to 
prefer one to the other. Ethically, however, we would suggest this is not the case and, 
as such, when moving forward we would argue there is a need for ontological security 
studies, not only to explore cases of closing down around identity, but also cases of 
opening up; in particular, to understand the ways in which potential ontological 
anxieties have been managed without slipping back in radical othering by replacing 
amorphous anxieties with identifiable objects of fear. 
 
Third, we argued that the conflation of self with identity and the emphasis on 
securitization processes in much of the literature, when combined with a potentially 
limiting contrast between physical security and ontological security, has resulted in an 
empirical emphasis on cases highlighting how the quest for identity stability either 
results in violence or makes processes of conflict resolution inherently difficult. 
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Framed this way ontological security analysis carries the danger of restricting its 
understanding of its core concept to issues of subjects seeking security-from-violence 
or, for that matter, security-in-violence. To be clear, these issues are important, but in 
two respects we have argued ontological security analysis would benefit from 
broadening out its areas of concern. First, in order to provide a more accurate 
rendering of ontological security dynamics in world politics the emphasis on 
securitization processes needs to be balanced with analyses highlighting the 
mechanisms by which relations premised on friendship and other positive forms of 
difference may also provide the requisite form of constitutive difference necessary to 
generate ontological security. One possibility, for instance, would be to investigate 
why some states appear to vicariously identify with other states in order to generate a 
sense of status, self-esteem and ontological security (e.g. see Browning and Joenniemi 
2015b). Second, this broadening out is also necessary in order to better capture the 
extent to which – in some parts of the world, or in relations between particular groups 
of states, at least – the normative environment has shifted away from a preoccupation 
with Hobbesian forms of anarchy to an environment in which states increasingly 
compete with each other on different grounds – not least for attention and seeking to 
be the most attractive for investment. Insofar as such a transformation has taken place 
then ontological security seeking is liable to require different forms of identification 
more in line with new emerging norms of subjectivity/statehood. The emerging 
literatures on status seeking (Paul et al. 2014), stigmatization (Adler-Nissen 2014) and 
nation branding (e.g. Browning 2015) offer some potential avenues for investigation 
in this respect. 
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